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Abstract—Presently nations worldwide are starting to convert their aging electrical power infrastructures into modern, 
dynamic power grids.  Smart Grid offers much in the way of efficiencies and robustness to the electrical power grid, 
however its heavy reliance on communication networks will leave it more vulnerable to attack than present day grids.  
This paper looks at the threat to public key cryptography systems from a fully realized quantum computer and how this 
could impact the Smart Grid.  We argue for the use of Merkle Trees in place of public key cryptography for 
authentication of devices in wireless mesh networks that are used in Smart Grid applications.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The electrical power grid infrastructure forms the functional foundation of our modern societies.   The grid has served 
humanity well to now, but in the near future our electric power grids will reach a limit.  If left as they are power grids will not 
keep pace with our demands of them.  By 2050 worldwide consumption of electricity is expected to triple [1].  Governments and 
organizations have begun developing plans to implement electrical power grids with improved functionality, reliability and 
efficiency.  These new grids will have “advanced decentralized, digital, infrastructures with two-way capabilities for 
communicating information, controlling equipment and distributing energy” [2].  Generally referred to as the Smart Grid, this 
infrastructure will be better able to incorporate new forms of energy generation, as well as be self-healing, and more robust.  
However, these new systems will be complex, and will have the potential for numerous vulnerabilities.   
Smart Grid will combine several well established yet, distinct industries, namely the electrical power, information technology 
and communications industries.  These industries have different priorities and goals.  For instance, in the electrical industry the 
highest priority is human safety.  In the information technology industry the highest priority is confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information. For the Smart Grid cyber security measures must not get in the way of the safe and reliable power 
system operations [3].  
Each device in the new grid will likely have its own IP address and will use protocols like TCP/IP for communication.  Thus 
they will be vulnerable to similar security threats that face present day communication networks [4], however the stakes will be 
much higher.  That is, if present day social networking websites are brought down, or even if financial records are compromised, 
unpleasant situations could arise.  However, if a hospital loses power, then human lives are endangered.  The Smart Grid will take 
a generation to create and will bring great benefits to the power grid, but also tremendous risks in allowing so many devices to 
communicate with each other. 
This paper looks at one aspect of Smart Grid security, namely the use of public key cryptographic systems in electrical power 
grid equipment in the context of the potential future threat from a quantum computer attack.  This paper argues for the use of 
Merkle (Hash) Trees as opposed to public key cryptography systems in the Smart Grid, specifically when used to authenticate 
wireless devices.  
 
A.  PROBLEM STATEMENT  
In recent years wireless mesh networks (WMN) have received a lot of attention and have becoming increasingly popular 
topologies due to their cost effectiveness and robustness. With a WMN topology it is possible to cover the same area as with 
typical WiFi, but with less routers.  This makes them economically pragmatic to use.  It seems likely WMN will be widely used in 
the Smart Grid. 
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Authentication enables a node to ensure the identity of the peer node it wants to communicate with.  This must be done in a 
network to keep it secure when a new device is added.  Public key cryptography is a means by which this can be accomplished.  
The security of the public key system rests on a difficult math problem, which we will discuss later.  This problem is difficult 
today, however, if a new type of computer, called the quantum computer, is fully realized then this entire system is broken.  This 
is something we know today. 
Merkle trees can also be used for authentication, but their security rests on the use of cryptographically secure hash functions, 
which we understand to be resistant to a quantum computer attack.  Merkle trees were developed in the late 1970’s by Ralph 
Merkle.  A Merkle tree is a complete binary tree constructed from a set of secret leaf tokens, where each internal node of the tree 
is a hash of its left and right child. The leaves consist of a set of m randomly generated secret tokens.  Since it is a complete 
binary tree m = 2h where h is the height of the tree. The root is public and the result of recursive applications of the one-way hash 
function on the tree, starting at the leaves [5]. 
For this work we implement a Merkle tree authentication scheme and incorporate it into the ns-3 Network Simulator.  We then 
compare its performance to that of a publicly available version of a well known public key cryptographic system, namely RSA.  
This comparison will be based on time to compute, use of memory and number of exchanges required.  Our goal is to show that 
Merkle trees are a reasonable alternative to public key in terms of computational time and functionality yet since they are resistant 
to a future attack from a quantum computer, they are preferred.   
By its nature electrical equipment can difficult, disruptive, and expensive to replace or modify.  By using Merkle trees for 
authentication now, we can avoid future problem.  
 
II. BACKGROUND 
In this section we look at an example that demonstrates some of the weaknesses of our current power grid.  We also look at 
some of the early steps that have been taken to implement the Smart Grid and security issues that have already arisen.   
A.  THE NORTHEAST BLACKOUT OF 2003 
In August 2003 the U.S. Midwest and Northeast as well as Ontario, Canada experienced a blackout that left fifty million people 
without of power for days, with some parts of Ontario experiencing rolling blackouts for more than a week.  This was the largest 
power outage in North American history [6].  
In cases of natural disaster like storms or earthquakes, visibly destroyed infrastructure makes it easy to understand why power 
was lost and why it takes so long to restore.  Unlike those types of events, the 2003 blackout was triggered by a simple 
overgrowth of trees in Ohio.  14 August 2003 was a hot day, although not unreasonably hot for this region of the U.S. in the 
summer.  The hot weather created a large load on the grid; this was mostly the result of air conditioner usage.  In addition several 
key power generators were off-line, causing voltage in this area to be depressed.  In this part of the Midwest there are many utility 
companies.  FirstEnergy, which is composed of seven utility companies, was the domain where the fault occurred.  North 
American Electrical Regulatory Council (NERC) rules mandate that utilities must inform their neighbors when they are short on 
power.  FirstEnergy did not do this.  
Power lines normally expand and contract due to the effects of load and weather.  On this day in the Cleveland-Akron, Ohio 
area sagging high voltage transmission lines came in contact with overgrown tree branches causing a ground fault [7].  At 3:05pm 
EDT those lines tripped.  The failure of these transmission lines subsequently caused lower voltage lines to surge and trip.  These 
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failures then caused adjacent high voltage transmission lines to surge and trip, which at 4:06 EDT caused an uncontrolled 
cascading failure [8].  Millions of people, in cities like Cleveland, New York City, Baltimore and Toronto, were left without 
power.  
Although the most immediate cause of the failure was the transmission lines coming into contact with untrimmed trees, there 
were four underlying causes as documented in official U.S.-Canadian report on the incident: 
 
Reason #1: FirstEnergy’s failure to assess and understand the inadequacies of its system, particularly with respect to the 
voltage instability and vulnerability of the Cleveland-Akron area.  FirstEnergy was not operating with the appropriate voltage 
criteria.   
 
Reason #2: Inadequate situation awareness at FirstEnergy as the situation began to unfold. 
 
Reason #3: FirstEnergy’s failure to manage tree growth in its transmission right-of-ways. 
   
Reason #4: Failure of the interconnected grid’s reliability organization to provide effective real-time diagnostic support [9]. 
 
It is not unreasonable to conclude that the effects of this event could have been dampened, or even prevented, had an advanced 
decentralized, digital infrastructure with two-way capabilities for communicating information, controlling equipment and 
distributing energy been in place.  
  
B.  IMPLEMENTING THE SMART GRID 
In the U.S. the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 established that the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) has the “primary responsibility to coordinate development of a framework that includes protocols and model 
standards for information management to achieve interoperability of smart grid devices and systems” [10].  The NIST is a 
division of the U.S. Department of Commerce.  NIST issues standards and guidelines it hopes will be adopted by all computer 
systems, thereby promoting interoperability that will in turn promote economic development [11].   In recent years NIST has 
generated many important documents related to smart grid technology and concerns; including the NIST Framework and 
Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards and the NIST Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security.  Version 2 of the 
Framework (as it is referred to) was released in 2012.  The Guidelines version 1.0 was released in 2010.  Future releases of both 
documents are expected.  
These documents offer tools for organizations involved with research and implementation of Smart Grid technologies.  They 
are a starting point, a guide and a means to evaluate the framework of the Smart Grid.  These documents are not intended to be a 
report that prescribes solutions to issues [12].  Academic, governmental and industrial institutions are the target audience of these 
documents, and they are encouraged to “identify research and develop topics based on gaps in technical areas related to the 
functionality, reliability, security and scalability requirements of the Smart Grid” [13].   
In the U.S. most of the electrical power infrastructure was built up in the 1950s [14].  Electrical equipment is usually installed 
with the intention that it will be in service for many years, even decades.  To do otherwise would not be efficient or acceptable. 
Computer and communication technology advance at a much more rapid pace.   As a result, technology on the grid tends to lag.  
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Many functions in the grid today continue to use communications technologies similar to those that were used in the 1980s and 
90s for personal computer dial-up connections [15].  Considering the expense, potential for disruption, and difficult to reach 
locations of some of this equipment, it seems clear why it is not updated with the latest trends in the computer world; the 
electrical power grid does not abide by Moore’s Law.  
In the Smart Grid components like power generators, switchgear, control systems and the like will now be networked together 
much like Internet nodes, sending and receiving messages related to the health and operation of the system.   The Smart Grid will 
not be comprised of a single communication technology.  Rather, it will utilize different technologies and protocols at different 
levels.  It will be a network of networks [16].  “Networks are defined by connections between multiple locations or organizational 
units and are composed of many differing devices using similar protocols and procedures to facilitate a secure exchange of 
information” [17].  To ensure the reliability of the grid, data integrity must be maintained.  Failure to do so could then leave the 
system open to compromising of devices, man-in-the-middle attacks, denial of service attacks, introduction of malicious code and 
so on.  
 
C. WIRELESS MESH NETWORKS 
In a wireless mesh network each node is a peer, i.e., there is no special base station node.  Messages can then be forwarded 
through each peer to get to their final destination.  This makes them more reliable since each node only needs to transmit as far as 
the next node, and each node is usually connected to several other nodes [18].  Additional robustness comes from the fact that 
there can be multiple routes from source to sink.  The capability of a mesh network to create and modify routes also dynamically 
increases the reliability of the wireless connection [19].  A drawback with respect to the lack of a central infrastructure is that 
each node will be more complicated and as well as more expensive (both in terms of monetary cost and power required to run 
them).  For devices that are battery powered this could be an important issue [20].   
There are four main constraints on WMN, namely computing power, battery life, mobility and bandwidth [21].  The bandwidth 
on a WMN can be increased by adding more nodes. Typically a WMN is configured in three levels.  The first level is the Mesh 
Clients that connects to the network via Mesh Routers at the second level.  The Mesh Routers then connect to Mesh Gateways, at 
the third level, that provide access to other networks like the Internet [22]. 
WMN are extremely vulnerable to attacks due to their dynamically changing topology, absences of conventional security 
infrastructure, and wireless nature [23].  Wireless communications of the IEEE 802.11 and 802.15 varieties are known to be very 
easy to “sniff”, i.e., eavesdrop on communications.  Free network sniffers like Kismet and WireShark allow you to see network 
packets that are behind network communications.  Sniffing packets is completely passive, i.e., this activity is not directly 
viewable by the target system.  Passive attacks can compromise confidentiality.  WMN are also vulnerable to active attacks, 
where the activity is directly viewable by the target system.  These attacks could result in loss of availability, integrity, 
authentication and non-repudiation [24].  All wireless networks are inherently insecure because they are broadcast and have no 
real boundaries [25].  
A basic network of the Smart Grid is constructed hierarchically:  Home Area Networks (HAN), Neighbor Area Networks 
(NAN), and Wide Area Networks (WAN). NAN receives data from multiple HAN’s and provides a backbone for data to be 
transferred to electrical providers [26].  Deployment of the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) has already started with the 
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installation of smart meters in the field.   Smart meters provide detailed information on power usage at service locations, and 
usually form wireless networks. This gives us an early look at issues that could develop during this conversion to the Smart Grid.   
 
D. THE ZIGBEE STANDARD FOR WIRELESS NETWORKS 
The ZigBee standard defines a set of communications protocols for low-data-rate short-range wireless networking [27].  
ZigBee devices operate in 868MHz, 915MHz and 2.4GHz frequency bands and have a maximum data rate of 250 K bits per 
second [28].  The ZigBee standard is comprised of four networking protocol layers. The lowest layer is the physical layer (PHY) 
and directly controls and communicates with the controls and radio transceiver.  The next layer up is the Medium Access Control 
(MAC) layer with provides an interface between the PHY layer and network layer (NWK).  The MAC layer is responsible for 
generating beacons and synchronizing devices.  The NWK layer is next and is responsible for managing network formation and 
routing.  Finally, the top layer is the applications layer (APL) which hosts the application object.  The first two layers, PHY and 
MAC, layers are defined by the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [29].  ZigBee beholds to the 802.15.4 standard, but then goes beyond that 
to implement the top two layers.  So if a device is ZigBee it beholds to 802.15.4, but if a device is 802.15.4 that does not mean it 
is ZigBee. 
ZigBee is well suited for controls applications because it is a low power, low data communications protocol which can support 
a mesh topology.  WiFi is complicated and its transceivers are expensive.  Bluetooth uses a lot of power and is also complicated.  
The goal of ZigBee is to be simple and inexpensive [30].  ZigBee is meant for devices that do not interact very often, but when 
they are needed they need to power up and work quickly, then power down.  In this way they preserve battery life, which is a 
concern for some of these applications.  ZigBee is becoming increasingly popular since it is well suited for home automation, e.g., 
temperature sensors, lighting, smoke detectors, irrigation controllers, utility meters, et cetera [31].   
Certicom is a cryptograph company that provides authentication services to ZigBee networks.  They hold many patents related 
to the elliptic key cryptography (ECC) system.  ECC is a public key cryptosystem based on the discrete log problem.  Certicom 
uses ECC for their authentication [32].  If the quantum computer were available tomorrow all smart meters using this system 
would become insecure.  
Today we see new products on the market for wireless lighting controls.  Digital addressable controls have been on the market 
for some time, but wireless is new.  They eliminate the cost and labor associated with running conduit and wire between a light 
switch or occupancy sensor, and a light fixture.  Traditionally, this is how basic lighting control has been done.  Now with these 
new systems pipe and wire is not required for controls.  These wireless systems also allow for more fine grain control of lighting.  
These systems are expensive and not without their flaws, but they are now entering the market and finding favor among high tech 
companies that want to be in the vanguard of innovation.  Many of the systems currently on the market are not fully ZigBee, but 
instead use the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, and then implement their own layers above that.   
 
E. PSEUDO RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR FLAWS IN SMART METERS 
In 2010 security flaws were discovered in a radio chip set used in some smart meters.  This provides a good case study of the 
vulnerabilities that the new Smart Grid will face.  Smart meters form a part of what is known as the Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure (AMI).  These have already been deployed in many countries at this point.   
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Smart meters tend to be wireless and in this case they were using the ZigBee standard for their communications.  The flaws 
were discovered in the Texas Instruments radio chip set CC2530.  The CC2530 is a 2.4GHz system-on-chip featuring an IEEE 
802.15.4 compliant RF transceiver, which is suitable for ZigBee applications.  The CC2530 broadcasts at a frequency band of 
2400-2483.5, which is used worldwide and has up to 16 channels.  2.4GHz is not uncommon in many wireless devices such as 
WiFi networks, cordless phones, Bluetooth devices, et cetera [33]. 
The problems occurred in the CC2530 Z-Stack (ZigBee protocol stack) version 2.2.2-2.3.0.  The CC2530 specification state:  
 
The random-number generator uses a 16-bit LFSR to generate pseudorandom number, which can be read by the CPU or used directly by 
the command strobe processor.  It can be seeded with random data from noise in the radio ADC [34]. 
 
The first problem was the use of a 16-bit linear feedback shift register (LFSR) to generate random numbers.  With 16-bits you 
will have 216 or 65,531 internal possible states, i.e., random numbers.  These random numbers were being used for encryption of 
data.  A requirement for cryptographically random numbers is that they must be statistically random and unpredictable [35].  With 
65,531 internal states, this falls well short of the requirements needed to maintain a secure system.  We will discuss this below.  
The resulting random numbers were then used by the Certicom ECC crypto library to create session keys and digital signatures 
[36].  As we will see later an attacker only needs a subset of the output of the pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) to 
recreate the LFSR that generated them.  With this information an attacker will be able to know ahead of time what new number is 
going to be generated, i.e., the numbers will no longer appear random. 
The second flaw had to do with the ADC (Analog to Digital Converter) noted in the specifications above.  Computers by their 
nature are not a good place to find randomness, however PRNGs can be very good in providing the required amount.  To start, the 
generator requires a good (random) seed value, hence the use of the ADC.  Unfortunately, for unclear reasons the seeds obtained 
from the ADC are not evenly distributed, in fact they cluster around only a handful of values [37].   
This type of problem has been recognized in the NIST Guidelines; “Smart grid devices may have limited sources of entropy 
that can serve as a good source of true randomness”[38].  Entropy is a measure of the amount of randomness in a distribution [39].  
The solution to this may require additional hardware or some regime of seeding a PRNG on a device before distribution, but that is 
a mater beyond the scope of this paper.  The rest of this section will focus on the PRNG flaw. 
“A PRNG is a single point of failure for many real world cryptosystems” [40].  That is, to say if the PRNG fails to produce a 
good random set of numbers, the entire crypto system is considered broken. 
 
Fig. 1 
A LFSR is a shift register whose input is a linear function of its previous states.  Certain values of 
the shift register, called taps, are XORed together and then feed back into the register, the register 
then shifts 1 bit to the right.  “An n-bit LFSR can be in one of 2n-1 internal states.”  The case where 
the LFSR is all zero is excluded because that would result in the output being zeros forever [41]. 
 
Figure 1 gives the first four stages of a 5-bit linear feed back register.  The taps are at 3 and 5.  
The goal of the attacker would be discover the function being implemented by the LFSR.  Given 
the binary sequence being produced by the LFSR, the Berlekamp-Massey Algorithm can be used to 
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determine the smallest LFSR that can generate the sequence [42].  Using Berlekamp-Massey, this 16-bit LFSR is trivial to 
discover.  
Texas Instruments corrected the 16-bit LFSR flaw in version 2.3.0 of its Z-stack firmware.  It is unclear how many meters 
went into the field with this flaw, and how many of those have been corrected.   Pacific Gas & Electric reports that 5 million 
smart meters have been installed in their dominion alone [43]. 
Smart meters have not been without their controversy.  Largely this has stemmed from higher power bills, concern for radio 
frequency signals, but it has also involved the idea of privacy.  Data will now be available that will record very detailed and 
personal accounts of individuals lifestyles, habits and other information much coveted by the curious, as well as the malicious.  
However, this information is of integral importance to the creation of a cleaner, more robust, power grid for the future.  These 
issues only add weight to the fundamental importance of information security on the Smart Grid. 
 
III. EXISTING SOLUTIONS 
Authentication is a means by which trust is established in a network.  RSA is a type of public key cryptosystem that can be used 
in this application.  In this section we look at the strengths of RSA and how it is vulnerable to a quantum computer attack.    
A. AUTHENTICATION  
Usually the authentication mechanism in a non-WMN uses a centralized system, which administers access based on lists and 
certificates.   Since WMN are decentralized, the use of such servers is not always possible [44].   To this end public key 
cryptography can be used for authentication.   The NIST Guidelines suggests the use of public key cryptography on the Smart 
Grid, particularly as a basis for authentication operations [45]. 
In symmetric key cryptography, the same key is used to encrypt as to decrypt.  These ciphers are fast and reliable, yet are 
problematic in regards to secure distribution of keys.  That is, with the same key at both ends, if either key is compromised the 
whole system is broken.  Public key, sometimes called asymmetric cryptography, uses two different keys, i.e., a public-private 
key pair.  This has the advantage that if either key is compromised the system is not broken. Public key was developed in the 
1960s and 70s by government and academic researchers.  Considering that symmetric ciphers go back thousands of years, public 
key is very new [46].  Public key crypto systems are very robust and strong and if implemented correctly and offer some of the 
best protection available today. At its core the strength of the public key system rests on very difficult to solve math problems; 
namely, the factorization problem or the discrete logarithms problem.   These topics will be explored further below.  
B. AUTHENTICATION USING PUBLIC KEY 
Public key can be used to authenticate two devices in the following manner.  For clarity call one device Alice and the other 
Bob.   
Alice sends a message to Bob claiming to be Alice.  Bob needs more proof than this, so Bob encrypts a message R using Alice’s 
public key.  Since the public key is public, anybody can encrypt a message, but only the holder of the private key can decrypt the 
message.  Alice receives the message R, decrypts it then sends it back to Bob.  Since she is the only holder of her private key, she 
has authenticated herself [47].  
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In the graphic {R}A represents encryption of message R using Alice’s public key.  
 
Fig. 2 
 
 
C. RSA 
RSA is a public key crypto system that is based on the factoring problem. At present the fastest computers and most efficient 
algorithms “cannot feasibly factor an arbitrary 1024-bit number” [48].   
 
To create a public-private key pair two large prime numbers p and q are multiplied together to generate N.  Then a value e is 
chosen at random that is the relative prime (i.e., their greatest common divisor is 1) of the product  
 
(p -1) (q - 1),  
 
Finally we find the multiplicative inverse of  
 
e mod (p - 1) (q - 1)  
 
and call it d.   
 
Now we have all the components we need to satisfy  
 
ed = 1 mod (p -1) (q – 1).  
 
At this point p and q can be forgotten.   
 
The RSA key pairs then are: 
 
 Public Key: (N, e)    
 Private Key: d 
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Now let M represent our plaintext message and let C be our ciphertext. To encrypt we calculate the following: 
 
Me mod N = C 
 
To Decipher we calculate: 
 
 Cd mod N = M 
 
 
Here is a simple example [49] : 
 
p = 47, q = 71 
Then 
 
 N = p q = 3337 
 
 (p - 1)(q – 1) = 46 * 70 = 3220 
 
Choose a random number e (must be relative prime to 3220) say 79.  Then 
 
 d = 79-1 mod 3220 = 1019 
 
e and N are published and d is kept secret.    
 
Then to encrypt a message say:  
 
 M = 688232 
 
Break into blocks: 
 
 M1 = 688 
  M2 = 232 
 
Then: 
 68879 mod 3337 = 1570 = C1 
 23279 mod 3337 = 2756 = C2 
 
Then your cipher text is 1570 2756. 
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To decipher: 
 15701019 mod 3337 = 688 = M1 
 27561019 mod 3337 = 232 = M2 
 
It is not know for certain at this point if factoring is “difficult” [50].  That is to say, the best factoring algorithm asymptotically 
is the number field sieve, which is an exponential-time algorithm [51].  The strength of the public key crypto system lies in the 
fact that solving the factorization problem in a timely manner is beyond the reach of the most powerful computers and most 
efficient algorithms today.  
 
D. ARGUMENT AGAINST PUBLIC KEY IN SMART GRID 
Public key has a lot of overhead in terms of resources including time and energy.   Many devices on these networks can be 
resource poor.   These in themselves are important issues, but the focus of this paper is the threat of the quantum computer.   
The concern with information security is not just is it safe today, but will it be safe in 10, 20, 30 years?  At one time the 
German Enigma machine was the state of the art in data encryption, today breaking it is a challenging graduate level homework 
problem.   Hardware installed in an electrical power grid is meant to stay in place for many years and in the Smart Grid they will 
need to remain secure while in the field.  The Smart Grid needs to be built to last and, as best as possible, it needs to be “future-
proof” [52].  For this reason investigation into potential security problems related to networks is of great research interest at this 
stage of development of the Smart Grid.   
 
E. THE THREAT OF QUANTUM INFORMATION PROCESSING 
Today’s computer architecture is based around the transistor.  Invented in 1945 at Bell Labs, within 10 years the solid-state 
transistor completely replaced its predecessor the vacuum tube [53].  The transistor opened the door to the modern computer age 
by allowing computers to do more with smaller and smaller components.  In recent years the trend has been to increase computing 
power, by increasing the number of cores on a processor, i.e., increasing computing power by adding more transistors.  Multicore 
processors do indeed seem to be the future for computers in the near term and the potential for greater computational power 
seems close at hand as a result of the progress of miniaturization, “but this trend cannot continue indefinitely” [54].  Yet for the 
security of public key there is a greater threat, namely, a realized quantum computer that can break the factorization or discrete 
log problem in polynomial time.   
This paper focuses on the issue with the factorization problem, but several well know and widely used discrete log problems 
are worth mentioning.  Namely Diffie-Hellman, El Gamal, and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) are all examples of systems that 
are based on the discrete log problem.  “Once quantum computers become a reality, all currently accepted public key encryption 
systems will be completely insecure.”  The practical implications of this would be far reaching [55] 
The quantum computer is currently in its infancy.  As of 2008 the largest calculation such a machine could execute was 3*5 = 
15.  The underlying principle behind the quantum computer involves Einstein’s wave-particle duality.  The quantum computer is 
not bound to the limits of transistors or the binary system architecture. Quantum Information Processing (QIP) uses atoms held in 
a magnetic field instead of transistors.  These units are called qubits.  QIP exploits the laws of quantum mechanics, and as a 
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consequence a single qubit can take infinitely many quantum states.  It will be a great challenge to get hundreds and thousands of 
these atoms to act in unison and function correctly [56].  However, this then “allows for a much more powerful information 
platform than is possible with conventional components” [57].  It is more than just that a quantum computer would be faster, it is 
that in the realm of quantum physics a computer can solve the factorization or discrete log problem in polynomial time rather than 
exponential time [58].  
The modern computer’s design closely resembles the classic Turing machine.  The Turing machine was developed by, the 
British computer scientist, Alan Turing in the 1930s.  The Turning machine can effectively compute any function that is 
computable [59]. “They can have only finitely many states and they can only read and write one symbol at a time on a one-
dimensional tape” [60].  This is how modern computers work, executing instruction after instruction, linearly on a CPU; even 
multicore processors work like this.  The classic Turing machine can be thought of as having a single fixed state at any given 
time, the quantum machine on the other hand “has an internal wave function, which is a superposition of a combination of the 
possible basis states.”  Transforms of the wave function can then alter the entire set of states in a single operation [61]. 
Currently this is beyond our technological capabilities.  Large-scale quantum computer hardware require each qubit to be 
extremely well isolated from the environment, yet must be precisely controlled using external fields.  These problems are far from 
trivial [62].  However, “no fundamental physical principles are known that prohibit the building of large-scale and reliable 
quantum computers” [63]. 
In 1994 Peter Shor of Bell Labs showed that factoring problem and the discrete logarithm problems would not be an obstacle 
for a quantum computer [64].  Shor’s algorithm attacks the problem of finding the period of a function in polynomial time, as 
opposed to exponential time.  It uses quantum parallelism to produce a superposition of all the values of this function in a single 
step.  It then uses a quantum Fourier transform and measuring the yields, gives the period.  This is then used to factor [65].   
If the quantum computer is realized, the public key cryptosystem is broke.  Furthermore, electrical power grid equipment 
installed in the field with public key systems in their firmware will be vulnerable to attack.  Such an event could happen 
essentially over night, yet replacing electrical power infrastructure in critical and remote locations would be a very slow and 
expensive process.   
 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Public key algorithms use expensive modular arithmetic, exponential operations and are therefore not good fits for mesh clients 
[66].  An alternative to the use of resource hungry, quantum computer vulnerable public key authentication is a system based on 
Merkle trees.  It is well known that hash based algorithms like MD5 and SHA-2 are computationally less expensive than 
symmetric key algorithms, which in turn are computationally less expensive that public key algorithms.   
Popular cryptographic hash functions like SHA-1 or MD5 work much like block ciphers.  That is they take plain texts and split 
them into fixed sized blocks then iterated by way of a function for some number of rounds [67].  They are considered secure if no 
collisions have been found; SHA-1 was broken about 10 years ago [68].  They must be fast, and have the effect that small 
changes to the input result in large changes in the output.  This is known as the avalanche effect [69].   
Merkle trees offer low cost authentication for mesh clients.  Compared to public key, they are lightweight and quick to 
generate and offer the same, and in the case of quantum computer attacks, better security [70].   
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The strength of the Merkle tree authentication scheme rests on having a secure hash function, and practical cryptographic hash 
functions do exists.  The purpose of a hash function is to produce a “fingerprint” of message, that is, a hash function s() is applied 
to a file M and produces s(M), which identifies M, but is much smaller [71].  A cryptographic hash function must provide: 
 
1. Compression: The input file can be of any size, but the output must always be the same size. 
 
2. Efficiency: It must be relatively easy for the computer to compute the output. 
 
3. One-Way: Given only y of y = s(x), it must be computationally infeasible to compute x. 
 
4. Weak Collision Resistance: It is not feasible to modify a message without changing its hash value.  That is, given x 
and s(x) to find any y, with y ≠ x and s(x) = s(y) is infeasible. 
 
5. Strong Collision Resistance: We cannot find any two inputs that produce the same hash output.  That is, it is 
infeasible to find any x and y, such that y ≠ x and s(x) = s(y).   
 
The last item here refers to how resistant the hash function is to a class of attacks known as the birthday attack.  
 
A. THE BIRTHDAY ATTACK 
The birthday paradox is a classic topic in probability, the result being that with only 23 people in a room you have a better than 
50% chance of having two people with the same birthday.  The paradoxical part of this problem is that at first glance it would 
appear 23 people are too few.  A back of the envelope calculation however shows this is actually reasonable.   The number of 
comparisons required with n people in a room will be:  
 
n(n -1)/2 ≈ n2 
 
Now just working with n2 we know there are 365 days in a non-leap year and we get the following: 
 
n2 = 365 
 n = √365 ≈ 19 
 
Appling this to hash functions, if we have s(x) that has an output with n bits, then there are 2n different possible hash 
values—all values being equally likely.  Since  
 
√2n = 2n/2,  
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then by the birthday problem we can expect to have a collision after 2n/2 different inputs.  As a consequence to prevent this sort of 
attack, n must be substantially large that a brute force attack is not reasonable [72].   
The goal of the birthday attack on a hash function is not to find a message x such that s(x) = s(y), but rather it is to find two 
random messages x and y such that s(x) = s(y) [73].  “The strength of a hash function against brute-force attack depends solely on 
the length of the hash code produced by the algorithm” [74].   This is a key point, if a quantum computer is realized to defend 
against a known attack the hash code only needs to be increased in length. 
 
 
B. MERKLE TREES 
A Merkle tree is a complete binary tree constructed from a set of secret leaf tokens, where each internal node of the tree is a 
concatenation then a hash of its left and right child. The leaves consist of a set of m randomly generated secret tokens.  Since it is 
a complete binary tree m = 2h where h is the height of the tree. The root is public and the result of recursive applications of the 
one-way hash function on the tree, starting at the leaves [75]. 
The example below is of an m = 8 size Merkle tree.  This tree then has 8 one-time authentication tokens to offer.   
 
In a mesh application the client generates the tree, and the root 
of the tree is made public.  Thereafter, the client can prove its 
identity to any Mesh Router by comparing the published root, 
against the root that is generated when the hash function and 
authentication path is provided.  It is computationally infeasible to 
determine the secret token from the published root of the tree [76].  
This method is called “tree authentication” [77].  
Fig. 3 
 
For example, if we wanted to authenticate using leaf Y5. 
 
Let F be a mapping function that we define by: 
  F(i,j) = s(Yi) 
   F(i, j) = s( F(i,k), F(k+1), j) ) 
   where k = (i+j)/2 
 
1. F(1,8) is the root and already known by the receiver 
2. Requester sends F(1, 4) and F(5, 8) and the receiver computes: s( F(1, 4), F(5, 8) ) = F(1, 8)  
 
3. Requester sends F(5, 6) and F(7, 8) and the receiver computes: s( F(5, 6), F(7, 8) ) = F(5, 8)  
 
4. Requester sends F(5, 5) and F(6, 6) and the receiver computes: s( F(5, 5), F(6, 6) ) = F(5, 6)  
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5. Requester sends Y5 and the receiver computes:  
s(Y5) = F(5, 5)  
 
6. The receiver has now authenticated Y5 
 
Using this method, log2n transmission are required to authenticate, however only half of the transmissions are actually required.   
 
To recap, the client (requester) transmits to the receiver Yi and the 
path to the root.  The root is already known so no need to transmit 
that.  The client is authenticated by the fact that the receiver is able 
to regenerate the value of the root based on the function s() and the 
path provided by the client [78]. 
 
Fig. 4 
 
V. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS 
A. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS OF MERKLE TREES 
1. Computational Time Complexity 
A Merkle Tree is a complete binary tree.  The number of nodes at height h is 2h.  The height of the tree with n leaves is log2n.  
The number of internal nodes in a tree of height h is:  
    h-1   
 1 + 2 + 22 +….+ 2h-1    =  Σ 2i 
    i = 0 
  = (2h – 1)/(2-1) 
Therefore, there are (2h – 1) internal nodes [79].  
Then to build a Merkle tree in each node we have an asymptotic upper bound of O(2h) with additional cost for the hash 
function.  For our experiment we are using a non-cryptographic hash, which is faster than a cryptographically secure function.  
C++ uses MurmurHashNeutral2 as its hash function.  MurmurHashNeutral2 uses a “Merkle-Damgard-esque” construction for its 
hash [80].  This uses a padding scheme on the front end to make sure all input into the compression function is of the same length.   
The input is broken into blocks, which are then compressed.  The compression involves taken the result so far and combines with 
the next block.  Cryptographic hash functions like SHA-1, SHA-2, MD5 all work this way [81].  So we can say that 
asymptotically  MurmurHashNeutral2 and SHA-1 are O(ß).   
The tree is not a sorted tree, so looking up items is not very quick, however that is not a priority.  We are concerned with 
releasing leaves and returning paths for authentication.  But obviously, the more leaves, the larger the tree, the longer to build, the 
longer to traverse.  Our time to authenticate then is bounded by the height of the tree and the hash function, i.e., O(h).   
 
 
 
 
19 
Merkle trees, as well as RSA, we are concerned with the time to build and the time to authenticate.  Cryptographic hash 
functions work like block ciphers in that text is take, broken into blocks, then processed in some number of rounds.  The amount 
of time required to process the input text is proportional to its size, the size chosen for this model is 32-bits, in real life this size 
would have be much bigger to be secure.  The total time to build the tree is proportional to the size of the Merkle tree.  
 
2. Memory Complexity 
 For our tests we start with a small tree of depth 4.  That gives 24 = 16 leaves (secret leaf tokens) and 24 – 1 = 15 internal 
nodes (non-leaf nodes).  Since our key is length 32, every node has a 32-bit key.  These keys are concatenated and hashed and 
that new value is also kept at 32-bits. 
So in our example we would have 31 nodes with 32 bits 
in each node for keys, then we have 992 bits for keys, per 
node.  Additional memory will be required for links and 
other data structure information.  The amount of memory a 
Merkle tree will require then is proportional to the size of the 
tree, and the length of the key.  We can see in Chart 1 how 
these interact.    
Chart 1 
 
Then our upper bound is based on the size of the tree and the size of the key, so  
 
(2h +1) * ß = O(ß 2h).  
 
3. Message Complexity 
Once the tree has been build we need to calculate the amount of time to authenticate.  Again this is proportional to the size of 
our tree.  In our starting case of depth 4 we would have with 16 leaves that would require log216 = 4 transmissions.   
As shown in previous sections the Merkle tree sends an authenticating path back to the request.  However instead of sending n 
transmissions, it can all be done in a single “packet” that contains all values in that path, organized in a manner that can be 
recomputed.  This is done in our simulation with an array.  So instead of log2n transmission required there are log2n entries into 
the packet array, obviously the payloads in these packets will be bigger than if they were sent one at a time.  Still this approach 
helps to improve communication overhead and delays, in that 
there are simply less communications required.  So we will 
have three message exchanges.  However we should be 
concerned with the size of our key length, if too long that 
might not be advantageous to send such a large package.  Chart 
2, shows how this would increase depending on the size of the 
keys.  We have an upper bound of O(h ß) for message 
complexity. 
Chart 2 
MEMORY COMPLEXITY GROWTH 
 KEY LENGTH (BITS) 
32 64 128 
DEPTH 
4 992 1,984 3,968 
8 16,352 32,704 65,408 
16 4,194,272 8,388,544 16,777,088 
MESSAGE COMPLEXITY GROWTH 
 KEY LENGTH (BITS) 
32 64 128 
DEPTH 
4 128 256 512 
8 256 512 1,024 
16 512 1, 024 2,048 
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B. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS OF RSA 
1. Computational Time Complexity 
Public and private key generation by RSA relies on modular exponentiation.  This is when an operation is raising one number to a 
power modulo another number.  This is resource heavy—time, energy and processor resources.  Assume the public key: (N, e) 
and private key: d, satisfy: 
 
 lg e = O(1), lg d ≤ ß and lg N ≤ ß   
 
Then applying a public key requires O(1) modular multiplications and uses O(ß2) bit operations.  Applying a secret key requires 
O(ß) modular multiplications, using O(ß3) bit operations [82]. 
 
2. Memory Complexity 
In terms of memory consumption RSA does hold an advantage since it does not grow a large tree, one set of keys and it can 
authenticate with an unlimited number of devices.  For each node they only need to hold their private key.  Since public keys are 
public, the nodes do not need to retain that information. Therefore the amount of memory used in our test is 32 bits, the size of the 
private key.  The upper bound then is O(ß).  
 
3. Message Complexity 
RSA works in three exchanges, like those show in Figure2. The size of the key in our case will be 32-bits.  Of course in a real 
life situation the key would be much longer. The upper bound then is also O(ß). 
 
C. SUMMARY 
Chart 3 compares the complexities per node.  
 
COMPLEXITY COMPARISON 
 MERKLE 
TREE 
RSA 
 
COMPLEXITIES	  
BUILD TIME O(2h) + O(ß) O(1) + O(ß2) 
AUTH TIME  O(h) O(ß) + O(ß3) 
MEMORY  O(ß 2h) O(ß) 
MESSAGE O(h) O(ß) 
Chart 3 
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VI. EXPERIMENT SETUP 
In this section we look at our experiment.  The mesh network provided with ns-3 required modifications in order to simulate an 
authentication routine.  The simulation was run in Merkle Tree mode and RSA mode. This experiment was run on a MacBook Air 
running OS X 10.8.5, with a 1.8 GHz Intel Core i5 and 4 GB 1600MHz DDR3 of memory.   
 
 
A.  Wireless Mesh Network 
ns-3 is a discrete event network simulator.  It is widely used in industry and academia for the purposes of testing and evaluating 
networks. It is publicly available and comes with a number of different network types already set up.  A mesh network is one of 
them.  This mesh network, however, does not come set up 
with any functionality for authentication of nodes so that 
was added.   
Conceptually our network looks something like Figure 5, 
although with more nodes in the network and larger Merkle 
trees in the nodes.  In this figure we see a Merkle tree with 
4 leaves that can be used to authenticate, at this point it 
would have used up 3 and still have one more available.   
In industry today we are starting to see utilization of 
WMN for lighting control systems.  Currently these 
networks are limited to discrete sections of buildings, not 
entire buildings, and are often limited to no more than 64 
devices.  For this reason we defined this experiment to have 
a network of 64 nodes.  
Fig. 5 
B.  Merkle Trees 
The Merkle Tree algorithm was coded as described in the previous sections.  For the hash the hash() function available with 
the tr1/functional library of C++ was used.  This hash is faster than a cryptographic one.  
The Merkle trees were added into the existing ns-3 node structure, which represent devices in the WMN; these are defined in 
the network/ section of ns-3.  Here we added modules for creation and maintenance of Merkle tree.  When a new node is created, 
a new Merkle tree is created and store in the node.  Later when the nodes are being linked into a network, we add a functionality 
of authentication of nodes.  This was done in the mesh/model/dot11s section of ns-3.   
The initial assumption was that a Merkle tree with 16 leaves (depth of 4) would be sufficient.  If we assume a network of 64 
devices, then if every node can authenticate with 16 other nodes around it, that should be plenty to create a robust system.  Also, 
since a bigger tree consumes more resources, there is an advantage to having a small tree; deep trees are no more secure than 
shallow.  Our early tests showed that the Merkle scheme was much faster than the RSA scheme.  Obviously if Merkle had used 
SHA-1 or another cryptographic hash function it would have slowed a bit, but still should have easily beaten RSA.   However, if 
we consider RSA has no limit on the number of devices it can authenticate with then RSA does hold an advantage over Merkle tree 
in that sense.   
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C.  RSA 
The RSA model looks similar to the Merkle model shown in Figure 5, however instead of a tree in each node, RSA stores a 
private key.  The public key is made public so there is no need for it to be stored in the node.  The RSA software used was 
obtained from rsa Project available at [83].  This functionality was added in the same locations as the Merkle tree.  For our 
experiment we toggled between the two so only one scheme was active during a simulation.   
RSA can use the public/private key pair to authenticate itself with any number of other nodes; this is an advantage over Merkle 
trees.  That is the Merkle tree scheme needs to know ahead of time how many nodes it will need to be able to authenticate with.  
RSA on the other hand can authenticate with as many devices that have access to its public key.   
Most electrical systems today are relatively static in the sense that devices do not roaming form location to location.  Also 
these networks tend to be very well defined prior to installation and are not required to dynamically expand by large leaps   This 
makes our network simpler.  We can accept that our device will not need to be able to authenticate with a million other devices.  
RSA key generation calculations depend on the length of the keys.  For the sake of this test we choose 32 bits.  We also have 
the length of our Merkle root at 32 bits.  Albeit this would not be secure in a real system, it is gives us good modeling data in a 
reasonable amount of time.  We do test larger keys to see what impact the length has on calculation times.  
 
 
VII.  EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
So for our comparison we wanted to see how big of a Merkle tree we could build and authenticate with, in the time it takes RSA 
to build and authenticate.  Times were measured during the construction of the node, then again during the linking of the nodes 
where the authentication process was performed.    
 
A.  Build Time 
 
Figure 6 shows show built times.   
 
 
Fig. 6a 
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Figure 6b give a closer look at the time to build for the Merkle tree only.   
 
 
Fig. 6b 
 
We can see from Figure 6 that RSA is very slow to build compared to Merkle, taking 35000 milliseconds to build.  When 
compared to a Merkle tree of shallow depth, we see the Merkle scheme has a clear advantage.  We do see the Merkle scheme 
slow as the tree grows larger.  Around a depth of 16 we start to see noticeable slowing in the Merkle scheme.  At a depth of 16 
each node has 65,536 leaves to authenticate with. It was not possible to see at what depth the Merkle tree equaled RSA’s time 
because the computer that was running the tests started to report memory problems, then seize up.  At a depth of 25, which was 
the case where the computer started having trouble, we were building a Merkle tree with 33,554,432 leaves.  
We attempted to build a network with an RSA key of 2048 bits.  2048 bits would be considered a secure length.  This, 
however, proved to be an unattainable goal.  That is, the largest reasonable size key that could be built on this system was with a 
key of 256 bits, which was still short of what would be considered secure.  At 256, build time of the public-private key pair took 
over 22 minutes—for only 1 node.  Building a network of 64 nodes all of them taking 22 minutes to build would have taken on 
the order of 1408 minutes, or about 23.4 hours.  That gives us an idea of exactly how computationally expensive RSA is.  
 
B. Authenticate Time 
 
Figure 7a shows the amount of time to authenticate.   
 
Fig. 7a 
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Figure 7b takes a closer look at only the Merkle scheme.  
 
Fig. 7b 
 
For the Merkle trees we can see from the data that the larger the tree the more traversing of the tree we need to do to provide 
our authentication path.   Still Merkle continues to do better than RSA for authentication.  In these plots RSA is using a 32-bit 
key, with the 256-bit key, RSA did well worse than the Merkle tree taking on the order of 3 minutes to authenticate one single 
node.  This number would then be proportional to the size of the network and number of links.  What we can see from all of this 
is that Merkle trees are a viable alternative to the use of public key for authentication.  
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
This paper is meant to contribute to the discussion on going related to the creation of the Smart Grid.  The development of 
public key cryptography some 40 years ago was revolutionary, and its cleaver solutions to problems have found wide spread 
usage.  What we have shown in this work is that there is an alternative to public key crypto that is better when put in the context 
of future applications and future threats.   
In the decades ahead the electrical power gird we have today will not be able to handle what we require of it due to the 
demands of our increasingly electricity driven societies.  It has been widely reported that the current grid could not handle the 
load if every internal combustion car was swapped for an electric one [84].  Yet even before we consider cases like that, today we 
are still prone to expansive power outages that can last days, even weeks, and can affect millions of people. An important factor 
in the quality of life that we as a species will have in the future will depend on energy; how we get it, how we use it, how we 
distribute it.  The Smart Grid is an important step toward a future with a quality of life better than the one we have today.   The 
process of converting fully to the Smart Grid will take a generation, yet everything that is to come must be built on a solid 
foundation of information security. 
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